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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HERBERT LEE SHONDEL. 
Case No. 
11287 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Herbert Lee Shondel, appeals 
from a conviction of the crime of unlawful posses-
sion of LSD in the Third District Court of Salt Lake 
,...... 
\__,ounty 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged by information with 
the unlawful possession of LSD. After an unsuccess-
ful motion to quash, the appellant admitted his pos-
session and was found guilty as charged and sen-
tenced to the Utah State Prison for the commission 
of a felony. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the appellant's 
conviction should be affirmed. 
STATEJv1ENT OF FACTS 
On December 27, 1967, the defendant-appellant 
was arrested (R-10) and later charged by way of in-
formaticn for the unlawful possession of LSD on or 
about October 6, 1967 (R-12). 
At the time of trial, counsel for the defendant 
made an unsuccessful motion to quash the informa- 1 
tion, or, in the alternative, to reduce the charge to a 
misdemeanor based upon a contended inconsist· 
ency between the two acts (R-18, 37). The court de-
nied counsel's motion and informed defendant that 
he was charged with a felony. Whereupon, while 
not pleading guilty to the offense, the defendant ad-
mitted to being in possession of LSD, after which the 
court found him guilty as charged. Time for sen-
tencing was waived and the defendant was 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeter-
minate sentence as provided by law (R-18, 40). 
In 1967 the Utah State Legislature amended the 
Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, Title 58, Chapter 13a, 
U.C.A. (1953) to include d-lysergic acid diethyla-
mide, better known as LSD. This was accomplished 
by the addition of subsections 15 and 16 to 58-13a,l: 
U.C.A. (1953). This amendment, which was passeo 
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March 2, 1967, and became effective May 9, 1967, 
made the possession of LSD a felony. (See 58-13a-44, 
U.C.A. (1953), enacted L. of 1957, ch. 116, § 1.) 
During the same session the Legislature enact-
ed the Drug Abuse Control Law, Title 58, Chapter 
33, U.C.A. (1953). In this act, LSD, along with a num-
ber of other chemical compositions, was placed un-
der the headinq of "depressant or stimulant drugs." 
Its possession was declared a misdemeanor by sec-
tion 58-33-4(a). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO QUASH, AS THE LAWS OF 
UTAH RELATING TO POSSESSION OF LSD ARE NOT 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PRO-
TECTION, IN THAT WHILE THE UNLAWFUL POS-
SESSION OF LSD IS PROSCRIBED IN SEPARATE 
STATUTES, THOSE STATUTES ARE CONSISTENT IN 
THE PUNISHMENT TO BE APPLIED. 
The appellant contends that different provisions 
of existing Utah law in the form of the Uniform Nar-
cotic Drug Act, Title 58, Chapter 13a, U.C.A. (1953) 
as amended, and the Drug Abuse Control Law, Title 
58. Chapter 33, U.C.A. (1967), are in conflict with 
each other as they allegedly provide different pun-
ishments for the same offense. 
While it is true that both acts recite the unlaw-
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ful possession of LSD, it can hardly be contended 
that separate punishments are provided by each of 
these two acts. 
Section .S8-13a-44 clearly states: 
... Any person violating any other provisions [one 
of which proscribes the unlawful possession of LSD 
(Section .58-13a-1 ( 16) ) ] of this chapter, shall, upon 
conviction be punished for the first offense by a 
fine of not less than $1,000 or by imprisonment in 
the Utah State Prison for not exceeding five years, 
or by both such fine and imprisonment. . . . 
(Bracketed portion added.) 
It should be noted that that portion (section 58· 
l 3a-l (16)) adding unlawful possession of LSD to a 
felony statute, was passed by the 1967 Legislature, 
the same Legislature which shortly thereafter en-
acted the Drug Abuse Control Law. LSD was spe-
cifically designated as a "narcotic drug" in the 
amended subsection. 
While section 58-33-4(a) of the Drug Abuse Con-
trol Law indirectly designates the unlawful posses· 
sion of LSD as a misdemeanor, the limited import 
of that act can only be ascertained from a thorough 
reading of the entire act. One need only proceed to 
subsection (g) of section 58-33-6 of the same act to 
determine the real intent of the Legislature in deal-
ing with LSD. 
This subsection unequivocally states: 
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this act, 
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whenever the possession, sale, transfer or dispensing 
of any drug or substance would constitute an of-
fense under this act and also constitutes an offense 
under the laws of this state relating to the pos-
session, sale, transfer or dispensing of narcotic drugs 
or marijuana [Article 58, Chapter 13a, Uniform Nar-
cotic Drug Act, as amended], such offense shall not 
be punishable under this Act but shall be punish-
able under such other provision of law [notably 
58-13a-44]. (Bracketed portions added.) 
The appellant contends that because a prose-
cutor may avail himself of either statute in meting 
out punishment in differing degrees for the same 
offense, the appellant is being denied equal pro-
tection, and the legislation is therefore unconstitu-
tional. This contention may well have had merit if 
the prosecutor were free to pick and choose those 
portions of existing law which he desired to be ef-
fective and could likewise completely disregard 
those portions of the law with which he disagreed. 
Such is, of course, not the case, and the entire act 
or statute must be given effect. 
In giving- effect to the entire act, it can be ascer-
tained with little difficulty that a prosecutor is bound 
by very explicit language (to treat the offense in 
question as a felony and not as a misdemeanor). 
The appellant attempts to escape the affect of 
the language in section 58-33-6(g) which states that 
the offense ''. . . shall not be punishable under this 
act. ... " (emphasis added) by contending that such 
language might be directory as opposed to manda-
tory. 
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The question as to whether statutory language 
should be deemed directory or mandatory is not one 
of first impression in this jurisdiction. In the case of 
State v. Zeimer, 10 Utah 2d 45, 347 P.2d 111 (1960) 
which dealt, in part, with the proper interpretation 
of an habitual criminal statute, this court indicated 
that the word "shall" in a statute is usually pre-
sumed to be mandatory. In the more recent case of 
Sjostrom v. Bishop, 15 Utah 2d 373, 393 P.2d 472 
(1964), a case involving the proper interpretation of 
a statute requiring divulgence by city officials of 
campaign expenses and contributors, this court said 
that in determining whether provisions of a statute 
are mandatory or directory, the court must analyze 
the statute in light of its history and background, 
the purpose it was designed to accomplish, and 
what interpretation and application will best serve 
that purpose in practical operation. 
In view of the manifest intent of the Legislature 
to make the offense in question a felony by specific 
amendment to an already existing statute; and also 
in view of the apparent reaffirmation of that intent 
in a latter statute, it is difficult to conceive of the 
Legislature using anything but mandatory language 
concerning an offense about which they apparently 
felt so strongly. 
POINT II 
THE TRTAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S ALTERNATIVE REQUEST TO co~ 
STRUE THE OFFENSE OF POSSESSION OF LSD TU 
l 
BE A MISDEMEANOR, FOR IN FACT, THE LATEST 
EXPRESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, UNREPEALED 
BY IMPLICATION OR OTHERWISE, REAFFIRMED 
THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT THAT UNLAWFUL 
POSSESSION OF LSD SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE 
TREATED AS A FELONY. 
Assuming arguendo that where two enact-
ments of the Legislature are clearly inconsistent 
and irreconcilable, the latest expression of the Leg-
]slature takes precedence over the former, even if 
such occurs within the same legislative session. This 
contention has little relevancy where it has been 
shown that the enactments in question are in no 
way irreconcilably inconsistent. The respondent 
submits that the question of inconsistency or conflict 
has been adequately answered in the first point of 
this argument. 
It is interesting to note, however, that in accept-
ing the doctrine of "latest legislative expression," 
the appellant has difficulty in escaping the fact that 
section 58-33-G(g), U.C.A. (1953), which deferrs pun-
ishment to the felony statute, is a later legislative ex-
pression than that found in section 58-33-4(a). If 
chronology is the key to legislative intent, then 
again, the felony punishment must prevail. 
The respondent is indebted to the appellant for 
his citing Tortorica v. Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175, 397 
P.2d 984 (1965) which states that whenever possible, 
the court in construing statutes should give effect 
to every part of an act. Using this reasoning in con-
Junction with the ma_nifest latest expression of legis-
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lative intent, the respondent contends that the court 
below not only acted with propriety, but necessar-
ily acted within the narrow bounds of legislative 
mandate. 
POINT III 
THE 'I'RTAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING 
TO REDUCE THE CHARGE AGAINST THE DEFEND-
ANT TO A MISDEMEANOR IN THAT NO CONFLICT 
EXISTS AS TO THE PUNISHMENT AS A FELONY. 
STATUTORILY REQUIRED, FOR THE UNLAWFUL 
POSSESSION OF LSD, NOR CAN THE DOCTRINE OF 
LENITY APPLY. IF THERE BE SUCH, WHERE ONLY 
A SINGLE PUNISHMENT IS PRESCRIBED. 
In answering Point III of the appellant's argu· 
ment it would be, for the most part, a mere reitera-
tion of respondenf s treatment of Points I and II. Ap-
pellant maintains throughout each point of his argu-
ment that irreconcilable conflict demands reversal 
and a declaration of unconstitutionality. Little more 
can be said than by every measure of accepted 
standards for legislative interpretation and construc-
tion, no conflict exists between the disputed 
statutes. 
There are numerous authorities in which it is 
said that penal statutes must be construed strictly, a 
rule founded on the plain principle that the power 
of punishment is vested in the legislature in which 
lies the authority to define crimes and ordain pun 
ishment. The true rule is that stated in The Gauntlet: 1 
1 (1872) L.R. 4 P.C. 184, 191, per James L. J. in giving judgment 111 
the judicial committee. CF. 2 H & C 531. 
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No doubt. all penal statutes are to be construed 
strictly-that is to say, the court must see that the 
thing charged as an offense is within the plain 
meaning of the words used; must not strain the 
words on any notion that there has been a slip, that 
there has been a casus omissus; that the thing is so 
clearly within the mischief that it must have been 
intended to be included, and would have been in-
cluded if thought of. On the other hand, the person 
charged has a right to say that the thing charged, 
though within the words is not within the spirit of 
the enactment. But where the thing is brought 
within the words and within the spirit, there a 
penal enactment is to be construed, like any other 
instrument, according to the fair common sense 
meaning of the language used; and the court is not 
to find or to make any doubt or ambiguity in the 
language of a penal statute where such doubt or 
ambiguity would clearly not be found or made in 
the same language in any other instrument. 
The construction, as propounded by the re-
spondent, will avoid undesirable consequences, a 
cardinal goal ih interpreting legislation. Such a con-
struction would manifestly give meaning to dis-
played legislative sentiment and intent. Also, the 
law is presumed to be equitable, and it is a reason-
able and safe rule of construction to resolve any 
ambiguity in a statute in favor of an equitable op-
eration of the law. (See 50 Am.Jur. Statutes, § 369-
372.) 
As far ris the doctrine of lenity is concerned, it 
is interesting to note that the only cases cited by the 
appellant in his brief, Lander v. United States, 358 
lJ S. 169 (1958); Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 
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(1957); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955) con-
cerned the merging of possibly construed separate 
offenses into a single crime, and were astonishingly 
dissimilar with the case at hand. 
In any event, as was mentioned, it is extremely 
difficult to evaluate and apply such a doctrine 
where only a single punishment for a single offense 
is prescribed. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully submits that there 
is no irreconcilable conflict between the two acts 
of the Legislature which are herein discussed and 
although the Legislature may have inserted the pos· 
session of LSD in two separate statutes, it is clear 
from their expression in section 58-33-6(g) that they 
intended and in fact did provide for one punish-
ment for the possession of LSD and for that which 
the appellant was convicted and sentenced. This 
court should therefore affirm the decision of the 
lower court in denying appellant's motion and hold· 
ing that the appellant was properly charged with 
a felony. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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